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24 August 1972

DDCI ADDRESS TO ARMY INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL - FT HUACHUCA, ARIZ. 31 AUGUST 1972

THE ROLE OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

GENTLEMEN:

I WOULD LIKE TO DESCRIBE FOR YOU TODAY THE COMPOSITION OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, THE MAJOR FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AS THE HEAD OF THAT COMMUNITY, AND THE ESSENTIAL MEANS BY WHICH THOSE FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES ARE FULFILLED.

IT IS NOT STRAINING THE TRUTH TO SAY THAT THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AS WE KNOW IT TODAY RESULTED FROM OUR EXPERIENCE AT PEARL HARBOR. THE SPECTACLE OF VARIOUS DEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES WORKING EACH IN ITS OWN WAY, WITH NO MECHANISM TO COORDINATE EITHER THEIR EFFORTS OR THE RESULTS, COST OUR COUNTRY DEARLY. THIS DEBACLE CREATED THE DETERMINATION, FOLLOWING WORLD WAR II, TO ACHIEVE A COORDINATED NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE EFFORT. THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947 WAS AT LEAST PARTLY THE RESULT OF THIS DETERMINATION.

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THIS LEGISLATION WAS DESIGNED TO ENSURE ENOUGH COORDINATION SO THAT THERE WILL BE NO IMPORTANT GAPS AND NO UNDESIRABLE DUPLICATION IN THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE EFFORT. THIS ACT WAS THE LEGAL BASIS FOR CIA AND THE FUNCTIONS IT PERFORMS.

THIS STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION -- LIKE MANY PUBLIC LAWS--IS SET FORTH IN FAIRLY BROAD TERMS, HOWEVER, THE CONGRESS PROVIDED FOR FURTHER DEFINITION AND REFINEMENT OF CIA'S FUNCTIONS. IT SPECIFICALLY DIRECTED CIA "TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE NA-TIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL FOR THE COORDINATION OF SUCH INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES OF THE GOVERNMENT AS RELATE TO NATIONAL SECURITY." UPON RECEIVING PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL. THESE RECOMMENDATIONS ARE ISSUED IN A SERIES OF CLASSIFIED PAPERS CALLED NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVES. THE NSCIDS (THERE ARE 8 OF THEM) ESTABLISH THE FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY FUNCTIONS, AND THEY DIS-TRIBUTE ASSIGNMENTS OF RESPONSIBILITY AMONG THE DIFFERENT U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES.

NSCID #1 ALSO PROVIDES FOR STILL MORE PRECISE
ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITIES THROUGH THE ISSUANCE

OF DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVES. THERE ARE ABOUT 40 OF THESE. I COULD NOT BEGIN TO ACQUAINT YOU WITH ALL THE DETAILS COVERED BY THE NSCIDS AND DCIDS. BUT THE IMPORTANT POINT IS THAT THEY REPRESENT A MEANS FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TO UPDATE AND ADJUST TO THE CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES, NEEDS AND CHALLENGES FACING U.S. INTELLIGENCE.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT AND SUBSEQUENT PRESIDENTIAL INSTRUCTIONS GAVE THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE TWO PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITIES. HE IS BY LAW THE HEAD OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND, BY PRESIDENTIAL ORDER, THE CHIEF INTELLIGENCE OFFICER OF THE GOVERNMENT. IN THESE CAPACITIES, HE ACTS AS PRINCIPAL INTELLIGENCE ADVISER TO THE PRESIDENT AND AS COORDINATOR OF ALL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES RELATING TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES. THUS, THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE IS THE HEAD OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

LET'S CONSIDER THE COMPOSITION OF THE INTELLI-GENCE COMMUNITY.

THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, ABOUT WHICH I SHALL SAY MORE IN DUE TIME, IS, OF COURSE, PART OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

SECOND, THERE IS THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR PROVIDING GENERAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.

THE INTELLIGENCE UNITS OF THE ARMY, NAVY, AND AIR FORCE CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE PARTICULAR MISSIONS OF EACH ONE OF THE SERVICES. MUCH OF THE WORK OF THE THREE SERVICE INTELLIGENCE COMPONENTS IS COORDINATED BY THE DIRECTOR OF DIA.

IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT, THERE IS AN INTELLIGENCE UNIT WHICH SERVES THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE POLICY PLANNERS. IN A SENSE ALL OUR DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL ARE INTELLIGENCE GATHERERS. BUT THERE IS ALSO A REQUIREMENT FOR MEN WHO APPLY THEMSELVES PROFESSIONALLY TO THE ANALYSIS OF THAT INFORMATION TO DETERMINE ITS BEARING ON PRESENT AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY.

THE INTELLIGENCE COMPONENT IN THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION HAS A SPECIALIZED CHARTER DEVOTED TO THE VITAL FIELD OF INTELLIGENCE ON NUCLEAR ENERGY DEVELOPMENTS.

A PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION IS THE INTERNAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES, BUT YOU CAN EASILY IMAGINE THE VITAL

CONNECTION BETWEEN FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND INTERNAL SECURITY. SO THE FBI, TOO, IS A MEMBER OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. THE FBI AND CIA WORK CLOSELY TOGETHER, BECAUSE THEY ARE BOTH COMBATING AN INTERNATIONAL NETWORK OF COMMUNIST CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, WHOSE OPERATIONS AND AGENTS MOVE BACK AND FORTH BETWEEN THE U.S. AND FOREIGN COUNTRIES. (PARENTHETICALLY, IT SHOULD BE STRESSED HERE THAT BY LAW CIA HAS NO DOMESTIC INTERNAL SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY, AND IS FORBIDDEN BY LAW TO REPORT ON U.S. CITIZENS.)

Lastly, there is the National Security Agency, which holds a somewhat unusual position that I shall mention in a moment.

THESE, THEN, ARE THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY--CIA, STATE, DIA, NSA, AND THE SERVICE INTELLIGENCE COMPONENTS, AEC, AND THE FBI.

In order to round out the picture of the community, I must add a number of what we call "services of common concern." It might be more enlightening to call them National Intelligence Assets. These are activities which serve the

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ENTIRE GOVERNMENT RATHER THAN ANY PARTICULAR DEPART-MENT OR AGENCY. SUCH AN ACTIVITY MAY BE MANAGED, STAFFED AND FUNDED BY ONE AGENCY, BUT ACTUALLY OP-ERATE DIRECTLY FOR THE ENTIRE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

THE LARGEST OF THESE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
ASSETS IS THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, WHICH IS
RESPONSIBLE FOR CRYPTOLOGIC INTELLIGENCE—INTER—
CEPTING AND DECODING ELECTRICALLY TRANSMITTED
MESSAGES. ITS PRODUCT IS DISSEMINATED WITH ADMIRABLE
SPEED THROUGHOUT THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, AND
HAS PLAYED A VITAL ROLE IN MANY OF OUR MOST CRUCIAL
INTELLIGENCE JUDGMENTS OVER THE YEARS. IN ANY
CASE, IT IS ALWAYS FUN TO READ OTHER PEOPLE'S
MAIL.

SECOND, WE HAVE THE AIR FORCE TECHNICAL APPLICATIONS CENTER-OR AFTAC-A SPECIALIZED GROUP WITH GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITY. THIS EFFICIENT AND CAPABLE OUTFIT IS CHARGED WITH MONITORING AND REACHING TECHNICAL CONCLUSIONS ON NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS SET OFF BY ANY FOREIGN COUNTRY.

OTHER IMPORTANT NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ASSETS
ARE THE NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION CENTER,
THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES,

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OF CIA, AND I WILL DISCUSS THEM WHEN I GET TO THE INTERNAL WORKINGS OF THE AGENCY.

Now, all the agencies and organizations which make up the Intelligence Community are tied together, for guidance purposes, by the United States Intelligence Board, which we often refer to as USIB.

THIS BOARD WAS ESTABLISHED UNDER DIRECTIVES

OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL. IT ADVISES AND

ASSISTS THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE

PRODUCTION OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES, AND

IN ESTABLISHING INTELLIGENCE POLICY, OBJECTIVES,

REQUIREMENTS AND PRIORITIES. USIB MEETS REGULARLY

ONCE A WEEK--SOMETIMES MORE OFTEN.

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, BY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DIRECTIVE, IS THE CHAIRMAN OF USIB. This, By the way, Is one place where
THE DIRECTOR'S TWO JOBS--HIS "TWO HATS"--ARE VERY
CAREFULLY DIFFERENTIATED. WHEN HE CHAIRS THE U.S.
INTELLIGENCE BOARD, HE IS THERE AS THE PRESIDENT'S
PRINCIPAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, NOT AS THE HEAD OF
CIA. USIB PASSES ON THE AGREED, COORDINATED JUDGMENTS OF THE ENTIRE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY--WHAT

WE CALL "NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE"--AND IT MIGHT HAMPER THIS FUNCTION IF THE DIRECTOR WERE SIMULTANEOUSLY TO ACT AS CHAIRMAN AND TO ADVANCE THE VIEWS OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. FOR THIS REASON, CIA HAS SEPARATE REPRESENTATION ON THE BOARD IN THE PERSON OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

THE OTHER PRINCIPALS ARE

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THE STATE DEPARTMENT DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH;

THE DIRECTOR OF THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY;

THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY;
THE ASSISTANT GENERAL MANAGER OF THE AEC;
THE ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE FBI; AND
(JUST RECENTLY)

A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT.

SINCE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIA, THE INTELLIGENCE
CHIEFS OF THE ARMY, NAVY, AND AIR FORCE HAVE CONTINUED
TO ATTEND AND PARTICIPATE IN USIB, BUT AS OBSERVERS
RATHER THAN AS OFFICIAL MEMBERS. THEY RETAIN THE
RIGHT, AND, IN FACT, THE DUTY TO EXPRESS ANY DISSENT
THEY MAY HAVE ON MATTERS UNDER DISCUSSION, AND THIS IS
A FUNCTION THEY DO NOT HESITATE TO PERFORM.

I WOULD LIKE TO REITERATE THAT THE USIB IS CONCERNED WITH A WIDE VARIETY OF INTELLIGENCE MATTERS. THE BOARD SETS FORTH--AND PERIODICALLY REVISES--THE NATIONAL PRIORITIES FOR THE GUIDANCE OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN CHOOSING INTELLIGENCE TARGETS AND IN ASSIGNING ASSETS TO COVER THESE TARGETS.

THE USIB ALSO REVIEWS IN DRAFT FORM AND IN GREAT DETAIL THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES AND CERTAIN OTHER REPORTS WHICH THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE SUBMITS TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.

USIB IS SUPPORTED BY A NUMBER OF SPECIALIZED COMMITTEES WHICH FUNCTION IN SUBSTANTIVE FIELDS, SUCH AS NUCLEAR ENERGY, MISSILE INTELLIGENCE, AND ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE. OTHER USIB COMMITTEES PROVIDE A MEANS OF REGULAR CONTACT AND A CHANNEL FOR GUIDANCE TO CERTAIN INTERAGENCY PROGRAMS, SUCH AS SECURITY, AUDIO COUNTERMEASURES, AND THE EXPLOITATION OF DEFECTORS.

This, then, is a brief sketch of the structure and functions of the Intelligence Community as of November 5 last year. On that date the

WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCED THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD DIRECTED SOME MANAGEMENT STEPS FOR IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. I WOULD LIKE TO REVIEW THESE STEPS WITH YOU, AND ELABORATE ON HOW I BELIEVE SOME OF THE NEW MACHINERY OF THE COMMUNITY WILL OPERATE.

THE PRESIDENT'S OBJECTIVES IN DIRECTING THESE MANAGEMENT STEPS WERE TO ENSURE:

- --CONTINUING REVIEW OF THE RESPONSIVENESS OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE EFFORT TO HIS NEEDS.
- --STRENGTHENED LEADERSHIP FOR THE COMMUNITY AS A WHOLE.
- --MORE EFFICIENT USE OF RESOURCES IN THE COL-LECTION OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION.
- --AN EXAMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS WITH A VIEW TO ELIMINATING THE LEAST PRODUCTIVE ONES.
- -- IMPROVEMENT IN THE QUALITY, SCOPE, AND TIME-LINESS OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION.

JUST WHAT MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENTS WERE DIRECTED BY THE PRESIDENT? THE FOUR FOLLOWING STEPS REPRESENT THE MAJOR CHANGES:

--AN ENHANCED LEADERSHIP AND PROGRAM ADVISORY
ROLE FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

- --ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE.
- --ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES ADVISORY COMMITTEE.
- -- RECONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES INTEL-LIGENCE BOARD,

LET US DISCUSS THESE CHANGES, BRIEFLY, ONE BY ONE.

As we have seen, the Director of Central Intelligence has always had a responsibility for developing requirements for national intelligence and for coordinating its production. Under the restructuring directed by the President, the Director of Central Intelligence was asked to formulate a consolidated intelligence program budget, and to reconcile intelligence requirements and priorities with budget-ary constraints. While the Presidential directive did not give the DCI any increased command authority over the other components of the Intelligence Community, he was given the significant new responsibility of being informed on and expressing views with respect to the allocation of all intelligence resources in the community, particularly

THOSE OF A NATIONAL CHARACTER. IN THIS REGARD THE DIRECTOR MAY BE CALLED ON BY THE PRESIDENT, THE KEY CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES AND BY THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET TO COMMENT ON AND DEFEND THE INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS AND BUDGETS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND DEPARTMENT OF STATE. WHILE THE AUTHORITY TO INFLUENCE BUDGETS CARRIES CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE, THE OBJECTIVES OF THE PRESIDENT'S DIRECTIVE WILL CONTINUE TO BE ACCOMPLISHED LARGELY THROUGH FRIENDLY PERSUASION, HARD WORK, AND (HOPEFULLY) GOOD SENSE. I THINK THEY CAN BE ACHIEVED, AND WE HAVE MADE A PROMISING START. BUT IT WILL BE A SLOW PROCESS.

OTHER CHANGES DIRECTED BY THE PRESIDENT CON-SIST OF VARIOUS COORDINATING MECHANISMS THAT SHOULD MAKE FOR MORE EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. LET US LOOK AT THESE MECHANISMS, AND SEE WHAT THEY ARE DESIGNED TO ACCOMPLISH.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE FILLS A GAP THAT HAD BECOME QUITE WORRISOME
OVER THE YEARS. THERE WAS NO ARRANGEMENT FOR SYSTEMATIC FEEDBACK OF CRITICISM AND COMMENT FROM HIGH
POLICY USERS OF FINISHED INTELLIGENCE. THE NEW

COMMITTEE IS CHAIRED BY DR. KISSINGER, AND ITS MEMBERS ARE THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE, THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JCS, AND THE DCI--IN OTHER WORDS, THE POLICY LEVEL FOR WHICH NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE IS DESIGNED.

WITH THIS COMMITTEE, THE PRESIDENT HAS CREATED A FORMAL GROUP OF SENIOR POLICY OFFICIALS TO DEVELOP GUIDANCE FOR THE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCT NEEDED TO SUPPORT THE FORMULATION OF U.S. FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY. THIS COMMITTEE WILL ALSO PROVIDE FOR A CONTINUING EVALUATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCT FROM THE STANDPOINT OF PRIME INTELLIGENCE USERS. THIS WILL ENABLE THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TO RESPOND IN A MORE ORDERLY, TIMELY, AND EFFECTIVE MANNER TO THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE NEEDS.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES
ADVISORY COMMITTEE IS ANOTHER ONE OF THE DIRECTED
IMPROVEMENTS. THIS IS CHAIRED BY THE DCI AND INCLUDES
REPRESENTATIVES OF STATE, DEFENSE, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, AND CIA.

THIS NEW COMMITTEE WILL FORMALIZE AND UPGRADE PREVIOUS LOOSER INTERDEPARTMENTAL ARRANGEMENTS TO ASSIST THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE IN

CARRYING OUT HIS BROAD RESPONSIBILITIES REGARDING THE COORDINATED UTILIZATION OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES--MONEY, MANPOWER, AND EQUIPMENT.

THIS COMMITTEE WILL ALSO ASSIST IN PREPARING THE CONSOLIDATED INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM BUDGET.

THIS BRINGS US TO THE LAST OF THE MAJOR CHANGES--THE RECONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD. WHEREAS USIB PREVIOUSLY HAD SOME AUTHORITY OF ITS OWN, IT IS NOW LIMITED TO AN ADVISORY CAPACITY. THIS CHANGE HAS BEEN SPELLED OUT IN A NEW NSCID #1. IN ADDITION, THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE TREASURY DE-PARTMENT WAS ADDED, AND THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CEN-TRAL INTELLIGENCE WAS DESIGNATED VICE CHAIRMAN OF USIB. THE ADDITION OF THE TREASURY REPRESENTATIVE REFLECTS THE FACT THAT FISCAL AND MONETARY INTELLI-GENCE IS VERY MUCH FRONT AND CENTER IN THE GOVERN-MENT TODAY. THE PRESIDENT IS INTENSELY INTERESTED IN WORLD ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS, AND THE NEW SEC-RETARY OF THE TREASURY IS EAGER TO PARTICIPATE IN THE WORK OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITIES. I AM SURE THAT THE TREASURY REPRESENTATIVE ON THE USIB WILL MAKE A VALUABLE CONTRIBUTION.

I WOULD LIKE NOW TO TURN FROM THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AS A WHOLE TO THE FUNCTION OF CIA--SINCE THAT IS THE ORGANIZATION THAT MOST DIRECTLY SUPPORTS THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. ITS PRIMARY FUNCTIONS FALL INTO THREE BROAD CATEGORIES:

COLLECTION OF INTELLIGENCE;
COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS; AND
PRODUCTION OF FINISHED INTELLIGENCE.

WE FIND IT CONVENIENT TO DIVIDE CIA'S INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION EFFORTS--WHICH, INCIDENTALLY, ACCOUNT FOR ALMOST HALF OF OUR OPERATING BUDGET--INTO THREE GROUPINGS THAT REFLECT DIFFERENT MEANS OF ACQUISITION. THE FIRST IS OVERT COLLECTION WHICH, AS THE NAME SUGGESTS, COVERS INFORMATION SECURED BY OPEN OR NONCLANDESTINE MEANS.

OVERT COLLECTION INCLUDES THE MONITORING OF FOREIGN RADIOS, SUCH AS RADIO MOSCOW, RADIO PEKING, AND THE VOICE OF THE ARABS IN CAIRO, AND THE SCRUTINY OF THE WORLD PRESS. EVERY DAY

1,100 HOURS OF FOREIGN BROADCASTS IN 68 LANGUAGES,
SELECTING THE MOST SIGNIFICANT FOR IMMEDIATE TRANSLATION AND DISSEMINATION. IN ADDITION RADIO

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TRANSLATES MATERIAL FROM 3,300 FOREIGN NEWSPAPERS AND MAGAZINES. THIS RADIO AND PRESS COLLECTION PROVIDES MUCH INFORMATION NOT AVAILABLE IN OUR OWN NEWS MEDIA, SUCH AS THE TEXTS SPEECHES BY FOREIGN LEADERS, AND EXTENSIVE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC MATERIAL. IT ALSO GIVES INSIGHTS INTO WHAT FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS ARE TELLING THEIR OWN PEOPLE AND THE WORLD, SUCH AS SOVIET COMMENT ON THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO CHINA AND THE WAY RADIO HANOI IS HANDLING DEVELOPMENTS IN THE INDOCHINA WAR.

IN ADDITION, OVERT COLLECTION INCLUDES INFORMATION OBTAINED BY AMERICAN INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANIZATIONS WHO HAVE SPECIAL CONTACTS ABROAD, OR ACCESS TO INFORMATION OF INTELLIGENCE INTEREST. WE HAVE SOME IN MAJOR U.S. CITIES, WHICH CARRY ON THIS WORK QUITE OPENLY. I WOULD EMPHASIZE THAT THE INFORMATION THESE OFFICES COLLECT PERTAINS TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES; WE DO NOT GATHER MATERIAL CONCERNING U.S. ACTIVITIES.

THESE OFFICES CAPITALIZE ON THE WILLINGNESS OF
AN IMPRESSIVE NUMBER OF AMERICAN PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS,
BUSINESS FIRMS AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS TO COOPERATE

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ON A VOLUNTARY BASIS. THESE CONTACTS NOT ONLY SUPPLY VALUABLE INFORMATION ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC, SCIENTIFIC AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS, BUT ALSO HELP IN PURCHASING SPECIAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE VALUE.

STILL ANOTHER TYPE OF OVERT COLLECTION CONSISTS

OF THE PROCUREMENT, THROUGH OPEN CHANNELS, OF FOR
EIGN PUBLICATIONS, INCLUDING NEWSPAPERS, BOOKS,

SCHOLARLY JOURNALS, MAPS, AND UNCLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS.

AS YOU ALL KNOW, CIA ALSO UNDERTAKES CLANDESTINE INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION THROUGH OUR OVERSEAS STATIONS. THESE COLLECTION OPERATIONS MAY RELY ON AN AGENT PENETRATION, THE SURREPTITIOUS ACQUISITION OF DOCUMENTS, THE USE OF AUDIO DEVICES OR "BUGS," OR OFFICIAL LIAISON WITH A FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. CLANDESTINE COLLECTION CAN BE CATEGORIZED BY ITS PURPOSE. IN CIA, WE USE THE TERM ESPIONAGE TO REFER TO THE COLLECTION OF POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE, OR SUBSTANTIVE INFORMATION REGARDING, SAY, SOME FOREIGN POLICY OR INTERNAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, THE OUTPUT OF AN INDUSTRIAL PLANT, OR THE CAPABILITY OF A WEAPON SYSTEM.

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WE USE THE TERM COUNTERINTELLIGENCE WHEN WE WORK TO FRUSTRATE HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AGAINST THE U.S. OR OUR ALLIES, OR TO PROTECT OUR PERSONNEL AND OUR OPERATIONS FROM BEING PENETRATED OR ROLLED UP BY OTHERS.

A THIRD TYPE OF INTELLIGENCE GATHERING IS

TECHNICAL COLLECTION, WHICH DIVIDES INTO THE INTERCEPTION OF ELECTRONIC MESSAGES AND OTHER SIGNALS,

AND OVERHEAD PHOTOGRAPHY.

THE INTERCEPTION OF ELECTRONIC SIGNALS (OR							
SIGINT)	IS	HANDLED	MAINLY	BY	THE	NATIONAL	SECURITY
AGENCY,							

CIA PARTICIPATES ACTIVELY IN THE NATIONAL PROGRAM FOR EXPLOITING PHOTOGRAPHY FOR INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION THROUGH THE NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION CENTER—OR NPIC AS WE CALL IT. THIS CENTER IS ADMINISTERED BY CIA IN CLOSE COLLABORATION WITH THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, AND IS JOINTLY STAFFED BY THE TWO AGENCIES. AS THE NAME SUGGESTS, THE NPIC EXAMINES FILMS IN DETAIL AND ANALYZES AND INTERPRETS THE PHOTOGRAPHY AND OTHER IMAGERY. THE WORK OF THE NPIC FEEDS INTO AND SUPPORTS INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION THROUGHOUT THE COMMUNITY.

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More recently, NPIC has made an invaluable contribution to the success of the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks with the Soviet Union. Before even beginning talks, let alone signing the agreements in Moscow on May 26, our policy makers needed reliable intelligence concerning the numbers, capabilities, and deployment of Soviet strategic weapons. The Lion's share—BUT by NO MEANS ALL—of this intelligence was derived from NPIC's exhaustive examination of photography of the Soviet Union. The Soviets, of course, use similar methods to check on our strategic weapons. In fact, it was only after each side had developed the capability to inspect, regularly and with confidence, the territory of the other

EROM THE OUTSIDE THAT AN ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT BECAME POSSIBLE. THE AGREEMENTS SIGNED IN MOSCOW--IN
TYPICAL TREATY LANGUAGE--REFER TO THESE METHODS AS
"NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION," AND BIND
BOTH PARTIES NOT TO INTERFERE WITH THEM.

AFTER THE SIGNING OF THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS AGREEMENTS, NPIC'S ROLE ASSUMED EVEN GREATER IMPORTANCE. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY NOW HAS THE TASK OF MONITORING SOVIET COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREEMENTS, AND WE WILL LEAN HEAVILY ON NPIC IN CARRYING OUT THIS VITAL TASK. OTHER TECHNICAL COLLECTION SYSTEMS, SUCH AS THE ELECTRONIC SIGNALS (OR SIGINT) INTERCEPTED BY NSA, AS WELL AS "OLD FASHIONED" HUMAN SOURCES, WILL ALSO BE CALLED UPON. WE HAVE BEEN PREPARING FOR THIS JOB FOR SOME TIME NOW. I AM CONFIDENT THAT THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CAN ACCUMULATE THE EVIDENCE AND ACCOMPLISH THE ANALYSIS THAT WOULD PROVIDE TIMELY WARNING OF A SIGNIFICANT VIOLATION OF THE AGREEMENTS SIGNED IN MOSCOW.

TO ASSIST THE DIRECTOR IN CARRYING OUT HIS HEAVY RESPONSIBILITY FOR MONITORING SOVIET COMPLIANCE WITH THE SALT AGREEMENTS, HE HAS SET UP A SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF USIB PRINCIPALS. THIS COMMITTEE IS CALLED THE USIB STEERING GROUP ON MONITORING STRATEGIC ARMS

LIMITATIONS, AND IS CHAIRED BY THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. ITS THREE MEMBERS ARE THE DIRECTOR OF DIA, THE DIRECTOR OF INR FROM STATE, AND CIA'S DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE. THIS GROUP IS RESPONSIBLE FOR GUIDANCE TO AND SUPERVISION OF ALL INTELLIGENCE MONITORING ACTIVITIES REQUIRED UNDER THE SALT AGREEMENTS.

THE NEXT PRIMARY MISSION OF CIA IS <u>COVERT</u>

ACTION. THIS TERM EMBRACES OPERATIONS AND ACTIVITIES
UNDERTAKEN IN SUPPORT OF U.S. POLICY OBJECTIVES, BUT

IN THE PRESENT STATE OF THE WORLD, WE FACE AD-VERSARIES WHO HAVE DEPLOYED NUMEROUS AND WORLD WIDE CLANDESTINE RESOURCES, WHO ARE HIGHLY TRAINED IN THE TECHNIQUES OF CONSPIRACY AND SUBVERSION, AND WHO CON-TINUE TO USE THESE RESOURCES TO UNDERMINE UNITED STATES' INTERESTS.

THERE ARE OCCASIONS WHEN IT IS IMPORTANT FOR
THE UNITED STATES TO COUNTER THESE EFFORTS BY COVERT
ACTION OPERATIONS. THIS IS NOT NECESSARILY BECAUSE
OUR GOVERNMENT WOULD BE ASHAMED OF EITHER ITS OBJECTIVES OR ITS METHODS. IT IS PRIMARILY BECAUSE THE
JOB CAN BE DONE MORE EFFECTIVELY BY COVERT MEANS,

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COVERT ACTION--WHETHER OF THE POLITICAL OR THE PARAMILITARY TYPE--FALLS IN THE SHADOWY, TWILIGHT ZONE OF GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS THAT CONGRESS HAD IN MIND WHEN IT DIRECTED CIA TO PERFORM "SUCH OTHER SERVICES" AS THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MIGHT DIRECT. OUR CRITICS WOULD HAVE YOU BELIEVE THAT EVER SINCE CONGRESS GAVE THIS AUTHORITY IN 1947, CIA

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HAS DONE AS IT HAS PLEASED, WITHOUT REGARD TO OFFI-CIAL POLICIES OR OBJECTIVES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, AND SOMETIMES IN DIAMETRIC OPPOSITION TO THOSE POLICIES.

THIS IS NOT AT ALL THE CASE. THE FACT IS THAT WHENEVER THE CIA CARRIES OUT A COVERT ACTION PROGRAM OVERSEAS, IT IS WITH THE <u>PRIOR APPROVAL</u> OF THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE GOVERNMENT.

WHILE WE ARE ON THE SUBJECT OF SUPERVISION OF AGENCY ACTIVITIES I WOULD LIKE TO SAY THAT, CONTRARY TO GENERAL IMPRESSION, CIA IS SUBJECT TO RESPONSIBLE AND AUTHORITATIVE SUPERVISION ON A CONTINUING BASIS BY INSTRUMENTS OF BOTH THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES OF THE GOVERNMENT. IN THE SENATE AND HOUSE THIS SUPERVISION IS EXERCISED BY SPECIAL SUBCOMMIT-TEES OF THE APPROPRIATIONS AND ARMED SERVICES COMMIT-TEES. IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, CIA IS UNDER CLOSE SCRUTINY OF THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AD-VISORY BOARD, THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, AND THE VARIOUS COMMITTEES OF THE NEW NATIONAL SECU-RITY COUNCIL SYSTEM. THESE COMMITTEES PROVIDE AN EFFECTIVE MECHANISM FOR THE INTEGRATION OF THE Agency's activities with other overseas operations OF OUR GOVERNMENT.

OVERSEAS, THE PRINCIPLES OF SUPERVISION AND ACCOUNTABILITY ARE CONTINUED BY THE COUNTRY TEAMS, WHERE ALL AGENCIES ATTACHED TO AN EMBASSY, INCLUDING CIA, OPERATE UNDER THE GENERAL SUPERVISION OF THE AMBASSADOR.

THE THIRD PRIMARY MISSION OF CIA IS TO PRODUCE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, AND TO PROVIDE FOR ITS TIMELY DISSEMINATION TO THE PRESIDENT, THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, AND OTHER TOP POLICY-MAKERS. THIS IS ONE OF THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, AND ALTHOUGH SOME INTELLIGENCE ANALYSES ARE PREPARED SOLELY WITHIN CIA, A GOOD MANY OTHERS ARE PRODUCED WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF OTHER MEMBERS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES ARE OF THE LATTER TYPE. TO THOSE OF YOU WHO ARE NOT FAMILIAR WITH THE NIEs, THEY ARE THE BLUE-COVERED PAPERS WHERE, BY USING OUR PRESENT KNOWLEDGE OF A SITUATION AND EXISTING DATA AS A BASE LINE, WE TRY TO LOOK INTO THE FUTURE AND TO ESTIMATE WHAT IS GOING TO HAPPEN IN SOME PARTICULAR COUNTRY OR ON SOME PARTICULAR TOPIC.

MANY NIEs cover fairly standard topics such as, "The Outlook in Country A or Area B." Here we look

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AHEAD TWO OR THREE YEARS AND DEAL WITH BROAD TRENDS AND EXPECTED LINES OF POLICY IN THE COUNTRY OR AREA IN QUESTION.

ANOTHER GROUP OF NIEs are MORE SPECIALIZED PAPERS ON THE SOVIET MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT. THESE ESTIMATES ARE BUILT ON A SOLID BASE OF EVIDENCE; THEY GO INTO GREATER DETAIL AND GENERALLY LOOK AHEAD FOR PERIODS UP TO FIVE YEARS. THE PRINCIPAL ONES FOCUS ON THE USSR'S STRATEGIC ATTACK FORCES, AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITIES, AND GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES. THE PRODUCTION OF THREE ANNUAL PAPERS ON THESE TOPICS IS TIMED TO ASSIST IN THE PLANNING OF DEFENSE FORCE LEVELS AND BUDGETS.

A THIRD TYPE IS THE SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE, OR SNIE, WHICH IS COMPOSED OF AD HOC PAPERS ON IMPORTANT QUESTIONS OF THE MOMENT, SUCH AS THE EXPECTED REACTION TO SOME PROPOSED—BUT AS YET UNAPPROVED—COURSE OF ACTION BY THE U.S. AS A PURELY HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE, A SNIE MIGHT ASSESS THE REACTION IF THE U.S. WERE TO INTERVENE IN SOME FOREIGN COUNTRY. THE SNIE'S ARE USUALLY REQUESTED BY SOME POLICY—MAKER, AND, AS YOU CAN SEE, THEY OFTEN GET INTO SOME PRETTY SENSITIVE MATTERS.

ALL OF THE NATIONAL ESTIMATES ARE PREPARED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES, -25-

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WHICH I MENTIONED EARLIER AS ONE OF OUR NATIONAL IN-TELLIGENCE ASSETS. THE BOARD AND OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES ARE IN CIA, BUT THEY ASSIST THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE PRES-IDENT'S PRINCIPAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, NOT AS HEAD OF CIA. THE NIEs ARE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE. THEY MUST, THEREFORE, REFLECT THE CONSIDERED JUDGMENT OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, THIS IS ENSURED THROUGH THE PARTICIPATION OF ALL APPROPRIATE ELEMENTS OF THE COMMUNITY, THROUGH CONTRIBUTION OF FACTS AND JUDG-MENTS, IN THE PREPARATION OF THE ESTIMATE AND ITS REVIEW BY THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE BOARD. THE OBJECTIVE OF EACH ESTIMATE IS A CAREFUL AND THOUGHTFUL SET OF JUDGMENTS WHICH WILL BE OF THE GREATEST POSSIBLE AS-SISTANCE TO THE POLICY-MAKER AND PLANNER--AND IT IS PRESENTED AS THE DCI'S ESTIMATE.

IN LATE 1970, WITH NIE 11-8-70 ON SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES FOR INTERCONTINENTAL ATTACK, WE MADE WHAT WE BELIEVE TO BE A CONSIDERABLE IMPROVEMENT IN THE METHOD OF PREPARATION. IF YOU HAVE EVER TRIED EVEN TO LIFT THIS TOME, YOU KNOW THAT SOMETHING WAS ADDED.

THE FORMAT, IN FACT, WAS RADICALLY CHANGED TO MEET SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS EXPRESSED BY SECRETARIES

ROGERS AND LAIRD, AND DR. KISSINGER. THE EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS ARE CONSIDERABLY MORE DETAILED THAN IN EARLIER EDITIONS, AND THE EVIDENCE IS INTERPRETED SO AS TO PRESENT A WIDER RANGE OF POSSIBILITIES. IN PROJECTING FUTURE FORCES, IT GAVE ALTERNATIVES DEPENDING UPON THE DIRECTIONS THAT SOVIET POLICIES TAKE. DIFFERING VIEWS WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WERE SPELLED OUT MORE FULLY.

FURTHERMORE, SOME OF THE MORE DETAILED ANALYSIS
USED IN REACHING THE CONCLUSIONS WAS MADE AVAILABLE
TO THE USER IN ANNEXES APPENDED TO THE BASIC DOCUMENT. IN FORMER ESTIMATES, THIS KIND OF DETAIL WAS
EITHER OMITTED ALTOGETHER OR ONLY BRIEFLY SUMMARIZED.
IN SHORT, THE NEW ESTIMATES BETTER ENABLE THE USER
TO JUDGE THE EVIDENCE FOR HIMSELF AND TO UNDERSTAND
THE UNCERTAINTIES INVOLVED.

ANOTHER TYPE OF FINISHED INTELLIGENCE IS CURRENT INTELLIGENCE. MOST OF YOU ARE PROBABLY FAMILIAR WITH THIS INTELLIGENCE PRODUCT. IT IS DESIGNED TO ENSURE THAT THE DECISION MAKER IS WELL INFORMED ON THE BASIS OF THE LATEST AVAILABLE INFORMATION FROM ALL SOURCES, ON SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS WHICH MAY AFFECT THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES. IT

IS ALSO DESIGNED TO ALERT THE POLICY-MAKER TO AN INCIPIENT CRISIS. CIA MAINTAINS AN OPERATIONS CEN-TER WHICH, LIKE HAROLD'S CLUB IN RENO, OPENED YEARS AGO AND HAS NEVER BEEN CLOSED. THIS MAKES IT POS-SIBLE TO ALERT OUR PEOPLE TO PRODUCE SPOT CURRENT INTELLIGENCE OR TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION ON A 24 HOUR BASIS IN CRITICAL SITUATIONS. THE OPERATIONS CENTER IS ALSO CONNECTED BY RAPID AND SECURE COMMUNICATIONS TO THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER AND THE NA-TIONAL INDICATIONS CENTER IN THE PENTAGON, THE STATE DEPARTMENT OPERATIONS CENTER, AND THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM. THE FUNCTION OF THE NATIONAL INDI-CATIONS CENTER IS TO MAINTAIN AN AROUND THE CLOCK INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WATCH FOR INDICATIONS OF FOR-EIGN PREPARATIONS TO ATTACK THE U.S., ITS FORCES OVERSEAS, OR ITS ALLIES.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE HAS OFTEN BEEN COMPARED TO A NEWSPAPER. I BELIEVE THERE IS ONE SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE. CIA'S CURRENT INTELLIGENCE IS PRODUCED BY A GROUP OF ANALYSTS WHO ARE EXPERTS IN THEIR FIELDS AND WHO HAVE ALL SOURCES OF INFORMATION OPEN TO THEM. CIA'S CURRENT INTELLIGENCE IS DISSEMINATED IN DAILY AND WEEKLY PUBLICATIONS, SPECIAL MEMORANDA, AND SITUATION REPORTS ON CRISIS TOPICS.

I WOULD LIKE TO TELL YOU A LITTLE MORE ABOUT TWO OF OUR REGULAR CURRENT INTELLIGENCE PUBLICATIONS--THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN AND THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF.

THE BULLETIN IS PUBLISHED EVERY MORNING EXCEPT SUNDAY, AND IS ISSUED IN THREE EDITIONS, EACH DESIGNED TO MEET THE NEEDS OF A PARTICULAR READERSHIP. ONE OF THESE, THE "BLACK" EDITION, WHICH CONTAINS MATERIAL OF VERY HIGH CLASSIFICATION, IS DESIGNED FOR THE TOP POLICY-MAKERS. IT IS RESTRICTED TO INTELLIGENCE ON THE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUES, AND GOES TO ABOUT 35 SENIOR OFFICIALS. THE OTHER TWO EDITIONS DO NOT CONTAIN SUCH SENSITIVE MATERIAL, AND ARE FLESHED OUT WITH ITEMS OF LESS URGENCY FOR A MORE GENERAL AUDIENCE. THESE OTHER EDITIONS GET A MUCH LARGER DISTRIBUTION THROUGH THE MIDDLE AND LOWER ECHELONS OF THE GOVERNMENT.

THE BULLETIN CONTAINS FULLY COORDINATED INTELLIGENCE. ALTHOUGH CIA PREPARES THE DRAFTS AND DOES THE PRINTING AND DISSEMINATION, THE ITEMS REPRESENT THE COORDINATED VIEWS OF CIA, DIA, AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT. THE COORDINATION PROCESS WORKS SMOOTHLY, AND WE SELDOM HAVE DISSENTING VIEWS EXPRESSED IN

FOOTNOTES. NEVERTHELESS, THE FOOTNOTE MACHINERY IS STILL THERE TO USE IF DIFFERENCES PROVE TO BE INTRACTABLE.

THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF, ALSO PUBLISHED SIX DAYS A WEEK, IS CONSTRUCTED MOSTLY FROM THE CO-ORDINATED ITEMS PREPARED FOR THE BULLETIN. WE HAVE MADE EVERY EFFORT TO TAILOR DAILY BRIEF COVERAGE AND STYLE TO THE INTERESTS OF PRESIDENT NIXON, EVEN PRINTING IT ON THE LEGAL-SIZE PAPER SO FAMILIAR TO A FORMER LAWYER.

More seriously, we print our views and analysis—as distinct from factual reporting—in italics. This serves the double purpose of highlighting our thinking and of making it perfectly clear where reporting data end and analysis begins. We have also included a considerable quantity of extremely sensitive material that cannot be used in any of our other publications. This makes it a truly all-source vehicle, and unquestionably a more significant intel-ligence document for the highest policy level.

ANOTHER TYPE OF INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION COM-PRISES THE RESEARCH STUDY. THESE STUDIES COVER A WIDE VARIETY OF TOPICS--FOR EXAMPLE, AN ANALYSIS OF THE VARIOUS SECTORS OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY, THE OIL INDUSTRY IN IRAN, OR THE DEVELOPMENT OF LASERS IN FRANCE. THE STUDIES ARE OFTEN PRODUCED IN RESPONSE TO SPECIFIC REQUESTS FROM THE WHITE HOUSE, THE SECRETARIES OF STATE AND DEFENSE, OR THEIR SENIOR OFFICERS.

FINALLY, OUR PRODUCTION INCLUDES WHAT WE CALL BASIC INTELLIGENCE. THIS IS A DURABLE TYPE OF BREAD-AND-BUTTER FACT YOU FIND IN THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCY SURVEY--THE RAILROAD SYSTEM, THE CAPACITY OF THE PORTS, THE POLICE MACHINERY, THE MILITARY FORCES OF A PARTICULAR COUNTRY. AS THE NAME IMPLIES, THE NIS IS THE RESULT OF A WIDE COLLABORATION OF DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

THESE, THEN, ARE SOME OF THE PRINCIPAL VEHICLES
THROUGH WHICH OUR FINISHED INTELLIGENCE REACHES THE
POLICY-MAKERS WHO NEED IT.

As for the organization of the Central Intelligence Agency, CIA is divided into four principal
groupings--referred to as Directorates--and several
staff or special functions, the heads of which report
directly to the Director. An example of the latter
is the Office of National Estimates which I referred
to earlier.

Now for the Directorates, the DDI, or Intelligence Directorate, is the principal producer of finished substantive intelligence. This Directorate includes functional offices responsible for current intelligence, economic research and strategic (military) research, which provide the muscle for the production process. The DDI is also responsible for overt collection and for administering the National Photographic Interpretation Center.

THE NEXT DIRECTORATE IS THE DDP OR PLANS DIRECTORATE WHICH IS ANOTHER WAY OF REFERRING TO THE
CIA'S CLANDESTINE SERVICES. THEY CONDUCT ESPIONAGE,
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS.
THE DDP IS ORGANIZED IN A SERIES OF AREA DIVISIONS,
SIMILAR TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S REGIONAL BUREAUS.
IT HAS STAFFS FOR SPECIALIZED MATTERS SUCH AS PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS, COVERT ACTION AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. THE DIRECTORATE ALSO OPERATES OUR CLANDESTINE UNITS ABROAD, WHICH WE CALL "STATIONS." THE
PLANS DIRECTORATE AND THE CHIEFS OF OUR OVERSEAS STATIONS SUPPORT THE DIRECTOR IN HIS RESPONSIBILITY FOR
CO-ORDINATING THE COVERT COLLECTION OPERATIONS WHICH
ARE CONDUCTED BY OTHER U.S. INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS.

THE DIRECTORATE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, AS
THE NAME SUGGESTS, CONCENTRATES ON THE SCIENTIFIC
AND TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF OUR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING HIGHLY SOPHISTICATED TECHNICAL
COLLECTION OPERATIONS, TOGETHER WITH THE RESEARCH
AND DEVELOPMENT SUPPORTING SUCH ACTIVITIES, AS WELL
AS THE PRODUCTION OF SUBSTANTIVE INTELLIGENCE ON
THE S&T CAPABILITIES OF FOREIGN NATIONS, THIS DIRECTORATE ALSO HOUSES OUR CENTRAL ELECTRONIC COMPUTER CENTER,

THE FOURTH DIRECTORATE IS THE <u>Support Directorate</u>, which embraces the very important and highly specialized Support Services, such as security, communications, training, personnel, finance, logistics, printing and the housekeeping functions,

BEFORE CLOSING, I WOULD LIKE TO MENTION TWO OTHER WAYS IN WHICH CIA AND THE REST OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROVIDE THE INTELLIGENCE INPUT FOR THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS. WE DO THIS, I WOULD STRESS, WITHOUT PARTICIPATING IN SUBSTANTIVE DEBATES CONCERNING POLICY POSITIONS.

ONE WAY WE PARTICIPATE IS THROUGH THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL APPARATUS, AND THE PRODUCTION OF

NATIONAL SECURITY STUDY MEMORANDA--WHAT WE HAVE COME TO CALL NSSMs. This process enables us to carry out OUR ADVISORY AND POLICY SUPPORT ROLE IN A DIRECT FASHION AND AT A LEVEL PREVIOUSLY RATHER UNUSUAL FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

WELL OVER A HUNDRED OF THESE NSSMS HAVE BEEN COMMISSIONED, AND CIA PARTICIPATED IN THE GREAT MAJORITY OF THEM. THESE STUDIES RANGE FROM HIGHLY SPECIFIC PROJECTS, SUCH AS U.S. POLICY TOWARD SPAIN, TO LENGTHY AND WIDE-RANGING STUDIES OF CHOICES FOR THE U.S. STRATEGIC POSTURE. SOME, LIKE THE WORLD OIL PROBLEM, HAVE SHORT, CRISIS-LIKE DEADLINES, WHILE OTHERS GO ON FOR THE BEST PART OF A YEAR.

OUR FUNCTION IN THIS PROCESS IS TO SUPPLY THE INTELLIGENCE FACTS AND MAKE THE INTELLIGENCE JUDG-MENTS WHICH GO INTO THE ARRAY OF POLICY OPTIONS WHICH A NSSM IS DESIGNED TO PRESENT TO THE PRESIDENT. THESE EFFORTS HAVE COME TO TAKE A CONSIDERABLE SLICE OF OUR TIME, ESPECIALLY THAT OF OUR SENIOR OFFICERS. IN MY VIEW, HOWEVER, THIS NEW PROCEDURE OF INVOLVING INTELLIGENCE IN THE POLICY-MAKING MACHINERY MAKES FOR A MUCH FULLER USE OF THE COMMUNITY'S CAPABILITIES. WE ARE, TO USE TODAY'S JARGON, MORE RELEVANT.

LASTLY, THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE IS CALLED UPON TO BRIEF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ITSELF ON THE INTELLIGENCE ASPECTS OF ISSUES TO BE DISCUSSED. SHORTLY AFTER THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION TOOK OFFICE, THERE WERE THREE SUCH BRIEFINGS ON THREE SUCCESSIVE DAYS. I MIGHT ADD THAT SCHEDULES OF NSC MEETINGS ARE HIGHLY TENTATIVE, AND WHILE WE CAN GUESS AS MUCH AS 10 DAYS AHEAD OF TIME THAT A BRIEFING WILL BE REQUIRED ON A GIVEN SUBJECT, THE PRECISE GROUND THE BRIEFING IS TO COVER HAS OFTEN EMERGED FROM A SERIES OF TELEPHONE CALLS GIVING AS LITTLE AS 12 TO 24 HOURS OF LEAD TIME. FURTHERMORE, THE COUNCIL—AND DR. KISSINGER IN PARTICULAR—IS EXTREMELY FOND OF VISUAL AIDS.

OUR GRAPHICS SHOP HAS BURNED A LOT OF MIDNIGHT OIL.

I HOPE THAT YOU HAVE GATHERED FROM MY REMARKS
THAT THE ROLE OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN RELATIONS TO NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY IS BOTH EXTENSIVE
AND IMPORTANT. IT CALLS FOR A LOT OF HARD WORK FROM
THE DEDICATED MEN AND WOMEN WHO STAFF THE VARIOUS COMPONENTS OF THE COMMUNITY. AS HAS OFTEN BEEN POINTED
OUT, OUR FAILURES GET WIDE PUBLICITY AND OUR SUCCESSES

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GENERALLY GO UNHERALDED. EVERY NOW AND THEN, HOW-EVER, WE GET A "WELL-DONE" FROM THOSE WHO REALLY COUNT. WE INTEND TO CONTINUE TO MERIT THEIR TRUST AND CONFIDENCE.